Entry P0 primary router for HackSkills. Use when the task involves web application testing, API security assessment, recon, vulnerability triage, exploit path planning, or choosing the right next category skill before any deep topic skill.

HACKING SKILLS / HackSkills Overview This is the master quality gate and technical router for authorized bug bounty, web/API security, pentest, code audit, source leak work, and (when the task is blue) SOC / detection / IR. It does not replace specialized techniques. It makes the agent: 1. Pass the start gate (authorization, role, scope, success definition) 2. Spend effort on paths that reach real control 3. Route by observed behavior to the correct category / deep topic skill 4. Prefer structured methodology over baseline model memory and scanner dumps This file is a quality gate, not a capability ceiling. Surfaces not listed here stay in play if field evidence exists. This file is not an exploit cookbook. Weaponized details live in deep topic skills and are used only on authorized targets. Load on demand: Red team execution → [RED TEAM.md](./RED TEAM.md) Test matrix and effort → [TEST MATRIX.md](./TEST MATRIX.md) Blue team execution → [BLUE TEAM.md](./BLUE TEAM.md) Code audit → [CODE AUDIT.md](./CODE AUDIT.md) Source leak → [SOURCE LEAK.md](./SOURCE LEAK.md) Evidence and report → [EVIDENCE REPORT.md](./EVIDENCE REPORT.md) 0. Task Start Gate Complete in order. Stop if any item is missing: 1. Authorization : written auth, RoE, scope, prohibitions, contact, emergency stop. No authorization → refuse. 2. Role : red team test / code audit / source leak / middleware audit / blue triage / detection engineering / IR. Parallel work is allowed; there is only one primary role. 3. Scope mode : User gave a fixed URL / system / repo → locked scope : follow same product hosts, gateways, API domains, and same host extra paths that the business flow naturally exposes. Do not scan unrelated brand lines. User gave an org name and asked to find boundary assets → exploratory scope : finish the current asset cluster before opening the next. Do not search many seeds shallowly. 4. Success definition : what "done" means for this task. Scanner finished, report emitted, and ticket closed are not success. 5. Destruction boundary : list actions that must never happen. 6. Working directory before any test: assets/ (URLs, API inventory, script excerpts), evidence/ (requests, diffs, screenshots), reports/ (confirmed findings only). 7. Questions : if scope is unclear, ask only the 1–3 technical blockers (target, stack, whether an account exists). Do not use "should I continue" as a way to stop. Missing a second account → degrade to what is testable; do not idle waiting for account B. Do not expand onto unauthorized assets. 1. Hard Constraints Stay in scope. Out of scope clues: record, then request expansion. No silent expansion. No destructive testing or destructive containment: delete other people's business data, DROP/TRUNCATE, bulk config change, encrypt/ransom like actions, unbounded DoS, wipe logs, wipe images. Write ops that prove access: create only identifiable test objects, delete that one object immediately. Do not change other people's orders, addresses, passwords, roles, or bindings. No charge, stock wipe, or account lock. Do not log out, revoke, or deactivate a session the user provided. If password/binding change is required to prove impact, revert immediately; if revert fails, stop at the response — do not brick the account. Do not cause irreversible damage to prove a break. Prefer read only, copy, or low privilege proof. Evidence must be readable and reproducible. A conclusion without repro steps is a hypothesis. Do not fabricate PoCs, logs, or exploit chains. If path, file, query, and screenshot do not line up, downgrade or withdraw. Copied secrets are clues until they pass the liveness gate : production accepts the real value (rejects a fake), and one read only call returns identity or an object list. A finding reached with a session is not "anonymous unauthorized". Anonymous only if the break had no login state. For internal users, assume false positive or mistake until the timeline proves otherwise. If a security control blocks real work, it will be bypassed. Remediation must include a usable safe path. 2. Role Routing User intent Primary flow Load Pentest / red team / foothold / SRC §§3–5 [RED TEAM.md](./RED TEAM.md), [TEST MATRIX.md](./TEST MATRIX.md) Code audit / whitebox / find sinks §3 R6 [CODE AUDIT.md](./CODE AUDIT.md) Source leak / Git leak / secret leak §3 R5 [SOURCE LEAK.md](./SOURCE LEAK.md), [insecure source code management](../insecure source code management/SKILL.md) Middleware / gateway / component audit §3 R7 [RED TEAM.md](./RED TEAM.md) middleware section, [unauthorized access common services](../unauthorized access common services/SKILL.md) Alert triage / SOC / hunting Blue quality gate [BLUE TEAM.md](./BLUE TEAM.md) Detection rules Blue B6 [BLUE TEAM.md](./BLUE TEAM.md), template in [EVIDENCE REPORT.md](./EVIDENCE REPORT.md) IR / forensics / containment Blue B7 [BLUE TEAM.md](./BLUE TEAM.md), [memory forensics volatility](../memory forensics volatility/SKILL.md), [traffic analysis pcap](../traffic analysis pcap/SKILL.md) Write the report §6 [EVIDENCE REPORT.md](./EVIDENCE REPORT.md) When a task crosses red and blue, freeze evidence for the current phase before switching role. 3. Operating Model Step 1: Draw the surface from the application With a URL or an application in hand, map the surface first: [attack surface mapping](../attack surface mapping/SKILL.md). Portrait, business plane, JS/traffic inventory (keys not just paths), response classes, object graph. Do not scan into a blank portrait. Do not open with directory brute or payload spray. Step 2: Route by observed behavior Signal First direction Load Input reflects into HTML / JS XSS / SSTI [injection checking](../injection checking/SKILL.md) Server fetches a URL / hostname SSRF [ssrf server side request forgery](../ssrf server side request forgery/SKILL.md) Accepts XML / Office / SVG XXE [xxe xml external entity](../xxe xml external entity/SKILL.md) Path, filename, or download is controllable Path Traversal / LFI [path traversal lfi](../path traversal lfi/SKILL.md) Many object IDs in APIs IDOR / BOLA / BFLA [auth sec](../auth sec/SKILL.md), [idor broken object authorization](../idor broken object authorization/SKILL.md) Login, reset, 2FA, sessions Auth bypass / JWT / OAuth [auth sec](../auth sec/SKILL.md) Multi step money, coupons, inventory, approval Business logic / race [business logic vuln](../business logic vuln/SKILL.md) MongoDB / JSON query syntax NoSQL [nosql injection](../nosql injection/SKILL.md) CLI tools, image processing, importers Command injection [cmdi command injection](../cmdi command injection/SKILL.md) HTTP parse / front back framing mismatch Request smuggling [request smuggling](../request smuggling/SKILL.md) Node JSON / controllable proto Prototype pollution [prototype pollution](../prototype pollution/SKILL.md) PHP weak compare / 0e hash Type juggling [type juggling](../type juggling/SKILL.md) Repeated param names / WAF app parse mismatch HPP [http parameter pollution](../http parameter pollution/SKILL.md) One time coupon / inventory / reset / invite Race [race condition](../race condition/SKILL.md) XML/XSLT templates XSLT [xslt injection](../xslt injection/SKILL.md) .git / .svn / .env / backups / public buckets Source leak [SOURCE LEAK.md](./SOURCE LEAK.md) CSV/Excel export CSV formula [csv formula injection](../csv formula injection/SKILL.md) WebSocket upgrade WebSocket [websocket security](../websocket security/SKILL.md) Internal package names Dependency confusion [dependency confusion](../dependency confusion/SKILL.md) Business API returns 401/403 Path / method / header bypass [401 403 bypass techniques](../401 403 bypass techniques/SKILL.md) Public middleware admin / default ports Default creds, debug, version defects [unauthorized access common services](../unauthorized access common services/SKILL.md) Chat assistant with command tools Does the tool actually execute [llm prompt injection](../llm prompt injection/SKILL.md) File upload / preview / convert Upload chain — do not stop at store+download [upload insecure files](../upload insecure files/SKILL.md) GraphQL / OAuth JWT / gateway Matching specialty; tick done or write N/A [api sec](../api sec/SKILL.md), [jwt oauth token attacks](../jwt oauth token attacks/SKILL.md) Opening one check class does not mean firing only that one shot. Walk the rest of the matrix. Step 3: Spend effort in this order Full pass/fail rules: [TEST MATRIX.md](./TEST MATRIX.md). Default order: 1. Unauthenticated access to another user, tenant, or subject 2. Auth takeover (issue session, reset, rebind, swap ticket) — in session or password change counts 3. Swap object identifiers (any field name: id / userId / tenantId / fileKey / openid / ciphertext PK) 4. With a session, walk the object graph: list → detail → attachment/export/approval, then writes and business logic 5. Injection / SSRF / XSS / command or template execution only on surfaces that show a diff 6. Salts, hardcoded keys, demo accounts in pages and scripts Do not stop on a half chain. Upload that stores, OTP that sends, or a copied secret string is not done. Confirmed medium on an object: follow it to write / cross user / takeover / execution before changing targets. A full "please log in" with no business fields is not an injection surface. Empty list, error, and timeout are not "please log in". Finish the current asset cluster before expanding. R1. Impact, not compliance Shortest path to influential control first. Each candidate: can the attacker harm a real user or system now ? The report narrative is the attack chain; CVSS is an appendix. Tenant admin "allowed in role" is still a finding if it reaches platform admin, other tenants, or other users. Rank findings with the impact ladder in [RED TEAM.md](./RED TEAM.md); layer 7 (pure compliance) is appendix only. R5. Source leak: mine the clue to the end Do not stop at " .git exposed" or "repo is public". [SOURCE LEAK.md](./SOURCE LEAK.md): full tree plus history → inventory secrets and hidden surface → live verify still valid secrets with minimal read only calls → treat the leak as a new attack surface list. R6. Code audit: sink→source, or source forward [CODE AUDIT.md](./CODE AUDIT.md). No complete taint path, or sanitizer proven effective → do not file as confirmed. R7. Middleware audit is document driven Read official docs for the exact major version, build a checklist, leave a trace per item. A middleware conclusion with no comparison table is unfinished. Blue quality gate (when the primary role is blue) Success is shorter dwell time, not close rate. Details: [BLUE TEAM.md](./BLUE TEAM.md). B1. Ask first whether this loses data, privilege, or the business now . One high confidence event plus a timeline beats a hundred context free alerts. B2. Alert fatigue is the main risk. Enrich before a human; every rule has an owner, FP profile, retro window, and retirement condition. Six months silent → check the log source first. B3. Containment defaults to reversible. Preserve evidence, then contain, then eradicate. Wiping logs is not containment. B4. Conclusions need a reproducible query, timezone, asset/user/src IP, raw excerpt, and a label (TP / benign TP / FP / insufficient evidence). B5. Expand the same user, host, IP, token, hash inside the window. Intel, IOCs, and leak samples entering a case are handled at source leak severity. B6. Detection engineering walks backward from the behavior that must be caught. Strict high confidence rules first. Quality gate in [BLUE TEAM.md](./BLUE TEAM.md).

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