email-header-injection
Email header injection and spoofing playbook. Use when testing contact forms, email APIs, password reset flows, or any feature that constructs SMTP messages with user-controlled fields. Covers CRLF injection in headers, SPF/DKIM/DMARC bypass, and phishing amplification.
By yaklang · 2,946 installs
npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill email-header-injection
Source repository · Upstream listing
SKILL: Email Header Injection — Expert Attack Playbook
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION : Expert email header injection and authentication bypass. Covers SMTP CRLF injection, SPF/DKIM/DMARC circumvention, display name spoofing, and mail client rendering abuse. Base models miss the nuance between header injection (technical) and email auth bypass (protocol level) — this skill covers both attack surfaces.
0. RELATED ROUTING
[crlf injection](../crlf injection/SKILL.md) — general CRLF injection; email headers are a specific high value sink
[ssrf server side request forgery](../ssrf server side request forgery/SKILL.md) — when SMTP server is reachable via SSRF (gopher://smtp)
[open redirect](../open redirect/SKILL.md) — redirect in password reset emails as phishing amplification
1. SMTP HEADER INJECTION FUNDAMENTALS
SMTP headers are separated by CRLF ( \r\n ). If user input is placed into email headers without sanitization, injecting %0d%0a (or \r\n ) adds arbitrary headers.
Injection anatomy
Encoding variants to try
Encoding Payload
URL encoded %0d%0a
Double URL encoded %250d%250a
Unicode \u000d\u000a
Raw CRLF \r\n (in raw request)
LF only %0a (some SMTP servers accept LF without CR)
Null byte + CRLF %00%0d%0a
2. ATTACK SCENARIOS
2.1 BCC Injection — Silent Email Exfiltration
2.2 CC Injection with Header Stacking
2.3 Body Injection — Full Email Content Control
A blank line ( \r\n\r\n ) separates headers from body in SMTP:
2.4 Reply To Manipulation for Phishing
2.5 Content Type Injection for HTML Phishing
3. COMMON VULNERABLE PATTERNS
PHP mail()
Python smtplib
Node.js nodemailer
4. SPF / DKIM / DMARC BYPASS TECHNIQUES
4.1 SPF (Sender Policy Framework) Bypass
SPF validates the MAIL FROM envelope sender IP against DNS TXT records.
Technique How
Subdomain delegation Target has include: spf.google.com ; attacker uses Google Workspace to send as anything@mail.target.com
Include chain abuse v=spf1 include:third party.com — if third party allows broad sending
DNS lookup limit (10) SPF allows max 10 DNS lookups; chains exceeding this → permerror → some receivers accept
+all misconfiguration v=spf1 +all allows any IP (rare but exists)
?all or ~all Softfail/neutral → most receivers still deliver to inbox
No SPF record Domain without SPF → anyone can send as that domain
4.2 DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) Bypass
DKIM signs specific headers with a domain key. Bypass vectors:
Technique How
d= vs From: mismatch DKIM signs with d=subdomain.target.com but From: ceo@target.com — valid DKIM, spoofed From
l= tag abuse l= limits body length signed; attacker appends content after signed portion
Replay attack Capture valid DKIM signed email, resend with modified unsigned headers
Missing h=from If from header not in signed headers list ( h= ), From can be modified
Key rotation window During DKIM key rotation, old selector may still validate
4.3 DMARC (Domain based Message Authentication) Bypass
DMARC requires SPF or DKIM to align with the From: header domain.
Technique How
Relaxed alignment ( aspf=r ) SPF passes for sub.target.com , DMARC accepts for target.com
Organizational domain mail.target.com aligns with target.com in relaxed mode
No DMARC record Domain without DMARC → no policy enforcement
p=none DMARC exists but policy is none → no enforcement, just reporting
Subdomain policy ( sp=none ) Main domain p=reject but sp=none → subdomains spoofable
4.4 Display Name Spoofing (Works Everywhere)
Even with perfect SPF/DKIM/DMARC, display name is not authenticated:
Most email clients show only the display name in the inbox view. Mobile clients are especially vulnerable.
5. MAIL CLIENT RENDERING ATTACKS
CSS based data exfiltration
Remote image tracking
Form action hijacking
6. CONTACT FORM / EMAIL API INJECTION
7. TESTING METHODOLOGY
8. DECISION TREE
9. QUICK REFERENCE — KEY PAYLOADS