attack-path-stitcher

Stitches confirmed single-asset findings into multi-hop attack paths across the organization. Builds a graph where nodes are assets and edges are confirmed exploit hops citing the findings that enable them.

By transilienceai · 719 installs

npx skills add transilienceai/communitytools --skill attack-path-stitcher

Source repository · Upstream listing

Attack Path Stitcher The Validation Run task ( 3) produces confirmed findings per asset . Real attacker risk lives in chains : a finding on asset A leaks credentials that enable a finding on asset B that pivots into asset C. This skill builds that graph. Mounted onto cloud agent task 6. Trigger Cron daily (default 03:00 UTC). May also re run after a Validation Run task batch completes. Workflow 1. Load inputs. validated/ .json — every confirmed finding across all engagements. artifacts/org surface.json — the org wide surface graph (assets, services, network zones, trust relationships). findings/finding NNN/evidence/raw source.txt — for credential / token extraction during stitching. 2. Build asset nodes. One node per asset in org surface.json , attributed with: tier , services , network zone , trust relationships . 3. Build edges — one edge per detected pivot. See reference/edge detectors.md for the seven detectors: Credential reuse (creds leaked on A reused as auth on B) Shared secret / API key (same secret appears in two assets' evidence) Trust zone transitive access (A in zone X has implicit reach to B in zone X) AD path hops (kerberoast / DC sync / RBCD chains) Cloud IAM role chains (assume role from compromised asset) SSRF → internal asset reach (A's SSRF reaches B's internal endpoint) Supply chain (A is a dependency of B per source code scanning SBOM) 4. Compute reachability closure. For each tier crown jewel node, BFS backwards through edges to find every external facing node that can reach it. Mark these as "entry points". 5. Write graph to artifacts/attack paths.json plus a human DOT file artifacts/attack paths.dot (renderable with Graphviz). Implementation runs through tools/chain merger.py which handles the graph construction. The skill provides the rules the tool consults; the tool does the iteration. Output attack paths.json schema: Crucial for RFP §3.3 compliance : confirmed paths contains ONLY paths where every edge has feasibility 1.0 AND every edge cites at least one validated finding. These are the "confirmed attack paths" the RFP requires. inferred paths carries topology / supply chain hops with no PoC evidence — surfaced for analyst review but excluded from remediation SLA buckets by risk prioritiser . Rules 1. Edges require evidence. An edge is only written if at least one finding's evidence corroborates the pivot. No speculative edges. 2. Bi directional ≠ assumed. If A reaches B, do not infer B reaches A. Each direction needs its own evidence. 3. Deduplicate by (src, dst, detector) . Multiple findings that enable the same hop merge into one edge with via findings listing all of them. 4. Feasibility ∈ {1.0, 0.5, 0.25}. Reliable PoC re run = 1.0; conditional (race, timing, specific user) = 0.5; theoretical (logically follows but never demonstrated) = 0.25. 5. Limit path enumeration. For each crown jewel, return top 10 paths per class (confirmed + inferred separately) sorted by feasibility × max cvss / hop count . Full graph is in attack paths.json for downstream prioritisation. 6. Read only. Stitcher never re fires PoCs and never touches findings/ . It only reads. 7. Bound graph size. Stop edge construction at 50,000 edges; cap path search depth at max depth (default 8 hops). Emit truncation.edge cap hit , truncation.depth truncated count , and truncation.topn dropped count in the JSON so downstream consumers can detect silent path loss. 8. Confirmed vs inferred is non negotiable. A path appears in confirmed paths only if every edge has feasibility 1.0 AND every edge has a non empty via findings . Trust zone only, shared secret only, and supply chain only chains land in inferred paths . This split is the contract that lets the RFP §3.3 claim "confirmed attack paths" stand. 9. Schema enforcement on input. tools/chain merger.py drops validated/{id}.json rows missing finding id or asset , or whose verdict != "VALID" , with stderr WARNs. Upstream validator must comply with the schema in projects/rfp 3.2/task 03 validation run.md . References reference/edge detectors.md — the 7 detector rules with concrete signal patterns. projects/rfp 3.3/task 06 attack path stitcher.md — cloud agent runtime contract.